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Abstract—Phishing is currently one of the biggest threats in
cybersecurity for both the business and the private contexts.
A large percentage of phishing attacks are blocked by
automated technical solutions, but unfortunately there is
often a delay between when phishing emails enter inboxes
and when the technical solutions are able to detect and
filter them out. To close this gap, it is common practice
for companies to implement mandatory phishing awareness
measures for their employees. But what about the private
context? We aimed at answering that question by analysing
94 anti-phishing webpages from eight different countries
and four organisation types. Our analysis revealed not only
contradicting recommendations, but also that most of them
are rather abstract (e.g. check the URL before clicking on
the link without telling what to look for) and lack guidance
on advanced phishing techniques (e.g. clone phishing). We
discuss the problems faced by readers of these webpages
and outline both immediate recommendations to the web
designer and ways forward to improve the current situation
as future work.
Index Terms—phishing, user awareness, anti-phishing rec-
ommendations, anti-phishing material
1. Introduction
Phishing is currently one of the biggest threats in
cybersecurity to both organisations and private citizens
[17]. According to Proofpoint, 88% of companies world-
wide faced phishing attacks in 2019 [34]. Over the years,
researchers have developed various technical solutions to
detect phishing attempts, e.g. [2], [11], [36]. However,
phishers are also improving their approach and using ever
more advanced techniques resulting in phishing attempts
that are not detected by technical solutions. This situation
often leads to a time lag between when the phishing mes-
sage is delivered to its recipient(s) and technical solutions
being able to detect it as phishing.
To address this gap, companies implement security
awareness measures to increase the likelihood that their
staff will detect phishing messages - e.g. by explaining
the phishing vectors (i.e. the delivery method) as well as
popular tricks used by phishers. But what about those not
working for a company that provides such measures? Prior
work by Redmiles et al. shows that 67.5% of their respon-
dents learned security behaviours from online, print, or TV
news [40]. They also found that digital-service providers,
such as banks, were a source of security recommendations
for 33% of their respondents. These results suggest that
people may be seeking out the recommendations found
on large organisation webpages, in an effort to better
protect themselves from various security threats, including
phishing.
This observation leads to our research question: which
anti-phishing recommendations can be found on the Inter-
net, and are they helpful to readers? To answer the ques-
tion, we collected 94 anti-phishing webpages from eight
different countries and four organisation types. We used
qualitative data analysis to identify the following aspects
of interest: (a) webpage features, e.g. which type of visual
support is used and which phishing vectors are presented,
(b) phishing cues to look for, both in messages and website
specific, (c) handling of detected phishes, and (d) action
to be taken if the reader fall for a phish. We find that
the anti-phishing webpages vary a lot in all these aspects.
We also found contradicting recommendations - e.g. Caixa
Bank [10]: “Spelling mistakes and other errors may alert
you to a fake email or website,” vs. Police Nationale
[33]: “Attention, the fraudulent messages are nowadays
written in a perfect French. Orthographic mistakes do
not allow anymore to identify or not a phishing attempt.”
Furthermore, we noticed that most recommendations are
rather abstract, e.g. check the URL before clicking on
the link, without saying what to look for. They also lack
advanced phishing techniques, e.g. clone phishing.
The conflicting recommendations and their variability
could cause confusion or annoyance among readers of
the webpages, leading to security fatigue [46]. The lack
of advanced phishing techniques and the abstractness of
the recommendations could also be the indirect cause
of various effects observed in other studies, such as re-
duced readers’ self-efficacy [6], and low effectiveness with
regard to increasing readers’ ability to detect phishing
attacks [35].
In the discussion we address the most prominent short-
comings we found, and we express some recommenda-
tions on how to solve them. Furthermore, we present our
proposal for a lasting solution to the current situation and
how we plan to achieve it.
2. Methodology
We first describe the process used to identify the or-
ganisations and their anti-phishing webpages. Afterwards,
we present the qualitative analysis approach we adopted,
i.e. how the codebook was created and applied.
2.1. Anti-phishing Webpages Collection Ap-
proach
For organisation types we chose the following four:
Bank, Internet service provider (ISP), Governmental
Agency, and University. These were selected as the most
probable ones readers would consider visiting to obtain
more information on phishing or in the event of a suc-
cessful phishing attack.
Furthermore, we decided to restrict our study to web-
pages from the USA, Switzerland and the six most popu-
lous state members of the European Union (i.e. Germany,
France, UK, Italy, Spain, and Poland). We decided to
reduce the scope to only these countries both to obtain
a more manageable amount of data and to avoid heavy
reliance on automated translation. We consider three or-
ganisations for each of the four organisation types per
country, i.e. 96 webpages in total (96 = 3× 4× 8, with 8
countries).
The selection of the first three organisation types (i.e.
Bank, ISP, and University) was based on the data pre-
sented in corresponding lists: Standard & Poor’s for the
Bank type [44], [45], national market share reports for
the ISP type [1], [7], [47]–[51], and QS World University
Rating for the University type [39]. We proceeded top-
down along each list until we found three organisations
per type with an anti-phishing webpage.
For the remaining fourth organisation type (i.e. Gov-
ernmental Agency), we selected the national consumer
agency, the security agency, and the national government
webpage of the respective country. We identified the re-
spective webpages with web searches using the Duck-
DuckGo search engine [57] and the keywords “country
consumers centre website”, “country government web-
site”, and “country police website”. Afterwards, we lo-
cated the search tool on each one and use the key-
words “antiphishing”, “anti-phishing”, “online fraud”, and
“fraudulent message” to locate the specific webpages
providing recommendations on the subject. In case the
anti-phishing webpage was not found using the English
keywords, we used WordReference [22] to translate them
in the appropriate language and run another set of searches
using the search tool.
However, it was impossible to collect all the organ-
isations for every country. Italy, Poland, and Spain have
no information about phishing on their government web-
page. To cope with the lower amount of webpages in the
Governmental Agency type, we decided to increase their
number by adding two EU1 agencies and one extra UK
webpage [15], [16], [18]. Also, only one Polish university
provides an anti-phishing webpage.
The final selection of organisations contains therefore
94 organisations from 9 countries, instead of the expected
96 from 8 countries.
2.2. Qualitative Analysis
This subsection presents the method used to extract
from the anti-phishing webpages the qualitative data to
analyse and the how we proceeded in this analysis.
2.2.1. Data Collection. We employed NVivo 12 [37]
for the open coding procedure to analyse the content
of the selected anti-phishing webpages. NVivo 12 was
selected as it is a software that allows the analysis of both
language-based and visual-based qualitative data. Namely,
the software allows to “Import text, audio, video, emails,
images, spreadsheets, online surveys, web content and
social media” [37] to be analysed. We captured every
webpage with NCapture [38], a NVivo extension for
Google Chrome and MS Internet Explorer. NCapture takes
a screenshot in the NVivo file extension (.nvpx) of each
webpage with all of its elements.
Note, cookie banners proved to be a problem for the
software. Since the cookie banners are elements of the
webpages, they were captured, often obscuring significant
portions of the text. As the problem still persisted after
accepting the cookies, we resolved the issue by installing
another Google Chrome extension, called “I don’t care
about cookies” [23]. The extension explicitly accepts
cookies and blocks the cookie banners from appearing2.
2.2.2. Coding of the Material. To identify common and
interesting aspects of the collected anti-phishing web-
pages, we started with an inductive coding approach [42],
[53]. The aim of inductive coding is to identify frequent,
dominant or significant aspects of text [53], in our case,
what common aspects of the anti-phishing webpages exist
that might impact the information a reader would learn
from them. The lead researcher open coded three anti-
phishing webpages from each of the four organisation
types. This researcher then used the resulting codes to
identify the most interesting aspects, resulting in 20 poten-
tial aspects. The potential aspects were then reviewed with
other members of the research team who used group dis-
cussion to refine and narrow the aspects to those most in-
teresting to study. Ultimately, eight anti-phishing webpage
features and five recommendation aspects were selected
to focus on. After scoping, the open codes were used to
construct a hierarchical codebook where the top of the
hierarchy were the 14 previously identified aspects, and
the lower levels were codes pertaining to each of them. For
example, the aspect Visual example presence have codes
1. While the EU is not a country, we explicitly decided to keep the
organisation type name ”countries”, despite adding the EU agencies.
2. This behaviour was necessary for our research purpose, but it would
be potentially harmful to readers’ privacy. Therefore, we recommend
against the use this extension.
below it of No visual example and With visual example.
The coders then iterated on the design of the codebook by
reading it, applying it on several anti-phishing webpages,
and then discussing to further refine the codes and their
definitions. The final codebook, with descriptions and
examples, could be found in the supplemental material
following the link https://secuso.aifb.kit.edu/anti-phishing-
webpages-supplementals. Disagreements in coding were
resolved through discussion. The coded material was then
analysed with descriptive statistics.
3. Results
The results discussed in this section are shown in the
tables 1, 2. Table 1 presents the results of the anti-phishing
webpage features analysis. Table 2 presents the results of
the analysis of the anti-phishing recommendations. The
results for all aspects are provided in the tables. However,
we want to use the following paragraphs to point out
several particularly interesting findings.
3.1. Anti-Phishing Webpages Feature Analysis
This section presents the results of the webpages fea-
tures analysis. The aspects presented describe both the
structure of each anti-phishing webpage and the type of
content presented. Namely, which phishing vector is de-
scribed, the scope of the recommendations (if only about
phishing, or on other cybersecurity threats), if there are
visual examples, which types of examples, their origin,
and if they highlight specific features, and if the webpage
has a section to help phishing victims.
3.1.1. Overall. This section will present the results of
all the anti-phishing webpage summed together, without
distinction between organisation type nor country. Table
1 shows that the 94 anti-phishing webpages appear al-
most evenly split between recommendations on Phishing
by e -mail only (45.74%) e.g. Socie´te´ Ge´ne´ral [20] and
recommendations on Multiple phishing vectors (48.94%),
e.g. Action Fraud [18]. Regarding the Recommendations
scope, 58.51% of the webpages are limited to solely
anti-phishing recommendations, e.g. Socie´te´ Ge´ne´ral [20],
while 41.49% also consider other cybersecurity threats,
e.g. Telecom (DE) [52].
Overall, almost 58% of the webpages provide only
text information, and No visual examples of phishing mes-
sages, e.g. Comcast [12]. When there are visual examples,
they are usually Screenshots of e-mails (67.39%), e.g.
UCM [25]. Very few webpages employ videos (19.37%),
e.g. MIT [29] or infographics (13.04%), e.g. Bank of
America [28]. Among the visual examples, only 32%
Highlighted important features that readers should con-
sidering when judging the legitimacy of a communication,
e.g. Banco Santander [43].
43.62% of the anti-phishing webpages have an expla-
nation section on what to do in case a reader becomes the
victim of a successful phishing attack, e.g. BT [8]. 93.62%
of organisations adopt a Neutral tone to communicate with
readers, avoiding threatening language or friendly tone.
3.1.2. Organisation Type Specifics. Table 1 also presents
the organisation type specific results. Looking at the
phishing vectors presented on the organisation webpages,
there are several differences between the types: Bank and
Government Agency types usually have recommendations
on Multiple phishing vectors (75.00%, 70.83%), while ISP
and University webpages focus on Phishing by e-mail only
(58.33%, 90.91%).
Regarding the Recommendations scope, we found an
almost even distribution among organisation types, except
for the University one, in which 86.36% pages offered
only anti-phishing recommendations.
Considering the presence of visual examples, the data
reveals that 50.00% of the Bank webpages show one, but
this value decreases to 41.67% for University, and 37.50%
for both Government Agency and ISP.
Regarding the presence of a section to help phishing
victims, Bank and Government Agency type webpages
are almost evenly split (50.00% and 45.83% with such a
section). ISP and University types, instead, show a lower
presence of such a section (37.50%, 40.91%).
3.1.3. Country Specifics. As can be seen in table 1,
country results are usually evenly distributed; however,
there are some interesting results worth noting. Regarding
the recommendations scope, German and Polish webpages
are almost evenly split between Limited to phishing and
On other cybersecurity threats (50.00%, 40%). Visual ex-
amples are almost always screenshots, except for German
webpages, where the number of videos and screenshots
are the same (25.00%). Victim section presence is gen-
erally balanced, except for Switzerland (66.67% without)
and Spain (where none of the anti-phishing webpages had
such section).
3.2. Recommendations Analyses
Table 2 presents the results of the recommendation
analysis. We will present the results divided by aspects:
i) Phishing cues, describing what readers should look
for to recognise a phishing attack. ii) Web-site specific
phishing cues, which contains codes presenting the cues
that readers should use to recognise a phishing web-page.
iii) Check directly when unsure, recommending readers to
contact a service directly, if they receive a mail that cannot
identify as legit or malicious. iv) How to react to phishes,
describing the action that readers should take to deal with
phishing attacks once they recognise one. v) What to do if
fallen for a phish, which describes the recommendations
given to readers that are victims of a successful phishing
attack.
3.2.1. Phishing Cues. Overall, we identify four recom-
mendations as the most given ones in the Phishing Cues
aspect, as shown in table 2. 70% of webpages inform
readers that phishing attacks often Ask for sensitive data,
e.g. “UPC Schweiz GmbH and other reputable companies
will never ask you for your passwords or other personal
information per email.” This very high frequency makes
it by far the most given recommendation of the aspect,
and the most given one among all other aspects.
All the webpages in the Bank type warn readers
against communications requesting sensitive data, while
TABLE 1. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-PHISHING WEBPAGE FEATURE ANALYSIS. ORGANISATION TYPES: BA = BANK, GA = GOVERNMENTAL
AGENCY, ISP = INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER, UN = UNIVERSITY. COUNTRIES: EU = EUROPEAN UNION (INTERNATIONAL), FR = FRANCE,
DE = GERMANY, IT = ITALY, PL = POLAND, ES = SPAIN, CH = SWITZERLAND, UK = UNITED KINGDOM, US = UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Types Countries
Recommendations All (%) Ba GA ISP Un EU FR DE IT PL ES CH UK US
Phishing vector
Multiple phishing vectors 46 (48.94) 18 17 9 2 2 4 4 5 6 5 7 7 6
Phishing by e-mail only 43 (45.74) 6 3 14 20 0 8 6 6 2 5 5 5 6
Non-specified phishing vector 5 (5.32) 0 4 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 0
Recommendations scope
Limited to phishing 55 (58.51) 11 12 13 19 1 8 6 8 4 8 7 5 8
On other cybersecurity threats 39 (41.49) 12 13 11 3 1 4 6 3 5 4 5 8 3
Visual example presence
No visual examples 54 (57.45) 12 15 15 12 0 6 8 8 7 5 6 9 5
With visual example 46 (48.94) 12 9 9 10 2 6 4 3 2 6 6 4 7
Visual example type
Screenshot 31 (32.98) 8 5 9 9 1 5 3 2 2 6 5 1 6
Video 9 (9.57) 4 2 0 3 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 2 1
Infographic 6 (6.38) 1 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
Visual example origin
From page owner 31 (32.98) 12 4 9 6 1 4 3 3 2 6 3 3 6
From other sources 11 (11.70) 1 5 0 5 1 3 1 0 0 1 3 1 1
Highlight important features
No highlighted important features 25 (26.60) 20 23 20 16 2 10 10 9 9 9 9 12 9
With highlighted important features 15 (15.96) 4 1 4 6 0 2 2 2 0 2 3 1 3
Victim support section
No section for victim support 53 (56.38) 12 13 15 13 1 5 7 6 5 11 8 5 5
With section for victim support 41 (43.62) 12 11 9 9 1 7 5 5 4 0 4 8 7
Tonality used
Neutral tone 88 (93.62) 21 23 22 22 2 10 12 11 8 10 11 13 11
Alarming tone 3 (3.19) 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Informal tone 3 (3.19) 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
among the other organisation types between 62.50% and
72.73% of anti-phishing webpages presented this recom-
mendation to readers. When we look at the country results,
we can see that Poland is the country with compara-
tively the fewest webpages that give this recommendation
(44.44%).
The second most frequently given recommendation
of the Phishing Cue aspect, with 45.74%, is watching
out for Poor grammar, e.g. “Some frauds are easy to
spot because they contain misspellings, misused words”.
Looking at the organisation type results, however, we
can notice that Governmental Agency webpages present
this recommendation less often than the others: 29.17%,
against 58.33% for ISP type, 50.00% for Bank types, and
45.56% for University.
However, Government Agency type, alongside Univer-
sity, also inform readers that grammar has become better
nowadays (respectively, 20.83% and 13.64% ), e.g. “By
the way, these emails are often perfectly formulated today,
whereas at the beginning of the phishing attacks they were
mostly written in very bad German.” This is one of the
cases of conflicting information we have identified.
40.43% of webpages tell readers that an Unusual
sender address, is usually a phishing cue, e.g. “E-mail
addresses used by scammers may differ from the authentic
ones by easy to overlook details, e.g. typos in the domain
name - instead of contact @ bank. pl - contact @ bank.
ppl . Addresses may also contain a distorted or incomplete
company or institution name.”
Only 12.77% recommend readers to be wary of com-
munications from Unknown senders, e.g. “Exercise cau-
tion and the principle of limited trust in messages from
unknown senders.”
The fourth most frequently given Phishing cue rec-
ommendation is to be wary of communications with an
alarming tone trying to instil panic or threat (39.36%),
e.g. “Be suspicious of any email with urgent requests for
personal financial information.”
However, when we explore the organisation type data,
we can see that the ones giving this recommendation are
mainly Bank and University types (58.33%, 50.00%); both
the remaining organisation types only present it 25.00%
of the time.
Lastly, 27.66% recommend against messages contain-
ing a link, and 23.40% webpages recommended to check
the link destination before clicking, e.g. “They contain a
link to a website”. Only 12.77% recommend to check the
attachment of a message, e.g. “BT will never send you an
email with an attachment”.
3.2.2. Website Specific Phishing Cues. The most given
recommendation is Check the URL in the address bar
(30.85%), e.g. “Also, look to see if the address in your
browser’s title bar is different to the one you expect.” The
organisation type that gives this recommendation the most
is Universities (45.46%).
TABLE 2. OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-PHISHING WEBPAGE RECOMMENDATIONS. ORGANISATION TYPES: BA = BANK,
GA = GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY, ISP = INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER, UN = UNIVERSITY. COUNTRIES: EU = EUROPEAN UNION
(INTERNATIONAL), FR = FRANCE, DE = GERMANY, IT = ITALY, PL = POLAND, ES = SPAIN, CH = SWITZERLAND, UK = UNITED KINGDOM,
US = UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Types Countries
Recommendations All (%) Ba GA ISP Un EU FR DE IT PL ES CH UK US
Phishing cues
Ask for sensitive data 70 (74.47) 24 15 15 16 0 8 8 11 4 8 10 11 10
Poor Grammar 43 (45.74) 12 7 14 10 1 8 7 6 1 4 4 6 6
Unusual sender 38 (40.43) 12 5 10 11 1 5 6 5 3 3 5 4 6
Use alarming tone 37 (39.36) 14 6 6 11 0 6 3 3 1 4 7 7 6
Have a link to a website 26 (27.66) 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 3 0
Content account related 24 (25.53) 9 6 6 3 0 5 2 3 3 1 3 1 6
Content too good to be true 24 (25.53) 6 7 9 2 0 4 2 3 2 3 4 4 2
Generic greeting 23 (24.47) 7 5 8 7 1 3 5 3 0 2 2 4 3
Link destination 22 (23.40) 3 3 7 3 1 4 2 2 1 1 3 4 4
Unexpected communication 19 (20.21) 5 8 3 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 3 6 3
Have an attachment 12 (12.77) 4 0 6 2 0 0 4 0 2 1 2 2 1
Unknown sender 12 (12.77) 5 3 3 1 0 1 3 0 2 2 2 1 1
Bad layout 11 (11.70) 3 3 4 1 1 0 2 2 0 2 0 3 1
Content payment related 10 (10.64) 4 4 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 3 3
Content software related 7 (7.45) 4 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 0
Grammar better nowadays 5 (5.32) 0 2 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
Ask to not check with legit 2 (2.13) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Web-site specific phishing cues
Check URL in address bar 29 (30.85) 7 7 5 10 1 3 2 6 2 3 3 3 6
Check for https 22 (23.40) 8 6 6 2 0 3 1 4 2 4 3 2 3
Type URL yourself 20 (21.28) 11 2 5 2 1 1 4 6 2 2 1 1 2
Check for lock icon 17 (18.09) 7 3 5 2 0 3 1 2 2 4 2 2 1
Bookmark sensitive websites 8 (8.51) 2 2 2 2 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 0
Check website legitimacy 4 (4.26) 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
Https not certain anymore 2 (2.13) 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Do not bookmark websites 1 (1.06) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Lock icon not certain anymore 1 (1.06) 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Check directly when unsure 52 (55.32) 14 12 12 14 2 7 4 7 3 5 6 12 6
How to react to phishes
Don’t click embedded links 57 (60.64) 16 18 12 11 2 7 9 8 4 2 8 10 7
Report attempt to page owner 40 (42.55) 16 5 8 11 0 5 5 5 4 2 2 9 8
Don’t download or open attachment 39 (41.49) 14 10 10 5 1 6 5 3 3 5 7 5 4
Don’t reply to the phish 32 (34.04) 8 9 6 9 1 6 3 4 3 4 2 5 4
Delete the phish 26 (27.66) 10 2 9 5 0 4 3 3 2 1 3 6 4
Report attempt to other organisation 24 (25.53) 5 12 5 2 1 5 0 1 2 1 3 5 6
Don’t open the phish 7 (7.45) 1 3 2 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 1 0
Mark the phish as spam 1 (1.06) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
What to do if fallen for a phish
Change your password 21 (22.34) 2 5 7 7 0 5 2 3 0 2 1 5 3
Check account activity 15 (15.96) 5 4 5 1 0 1 1 5 0 0 3 3 2
Report theft page owner 15 (15.96) 9 1 0 5 0 2 2 3 1 0 2 2 3
Report theft financial institution 11 (11.70) 0 4 6 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 2
Block compromised accounts 9 (9.57) 4 4 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 1
Report theft dedicated agency 4 (4.26) 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1
Https and lock icon are recommended to be safe anti-
phishing cues, at 23.40% and 18.09% respectively, e.g.
“A secure website will start with https:// in front of the
address.”, “Check that the website presents the padlock
symbol or that of a non-broken key, in the lower half of
the screen, indicating a safe website.”
However, two of the anti-phishing webpages tell their
readers that https is no longer a safe anti-phishing cue
and one single webpage notes that the lock icon is not
as effective as before to identify phishing webpages, e.g.
“HTTPS does not guarantee the authenticity of a website,”
“The security certificate, recognizable by the lock icon in
the status bar, is no longer a protection against phishing.”
3.2.3. Check Directly When Unsure. 52.33% of web-
pages provide this recommendation, e.g. “Contact the
relevant institution immediately if you notice anything
irregular with your bank account or other online accounts.”
It is evenly prevalent among organisation types, although
country-wise the United Kingdom greatly outpaced all
the other countries with 92.31% of webpages giving this
recommendation.
3.2.4. How to React to Phishes. As shown in table
2, 60.64% of the anti-phishing webpages recommend to
readers to avoid clicking on links embedded in dubious
messages, e.g. “Do not use the address or link received
by e-mail or instant messenger to log in.”. Among the
organisation types, University is the one with the lowest
frequency (50.00%), while the Spanish webpages show
this recommendation comparatively less frequently than
all others.
More than 40.00% of anti-phishing webpages ask
readers to report phishing attempts to the webpages’ re-
spective owner, although the precise dynamic is different
among the organisation types: Bank, ISP, and University
types specifically ask the readers to send them phishes
somehow related to them, e.g. “Tell us at once about spear
phishing emails purporting to be from Deutsche Bank!”.
Government Agency webpages request every phish that
impacts their citizens, because these agencies are usually
national organisations. However, only 20.83% Govern-
ment Agency webpages also request phishing attempts to
be sent to them. The majority of the requests for phishing
attempt reports are from Bank (66.67%) and University
types (50.00%). Among the countries, UK, France, and
USA are the ones that present this recommendation most
frequently.
Conversely, Government Agency webpages are the
ones that most likely recommend to report the attempt to
a different organisation (50.00%), e.g. “Inform the bank
from which apparently the e-mail is from.”
Just over 40.00% of anti-phishing webpages also rec-
ommend to avoid downloading or opening attachments of
emails identified as phishes, since they might be malware,
e.g. “Do not open the attachment of any suspicious e-mail”
27.66% of the webpages recommend to delete the
phish, e.g. “Delete the phishing emails”. However, only
one ISP webpage also recommends to mark the phishing
message as spam, e.g. “Mark the e-mail as spam.”
3.2.5. What to Do if Fallen for a Phish. As it can
be seen in table 2 the most common recommendation
given to phishing victims on anti-phishing webpages is
to change their password (22.34%), e.g. “Immediately
change any passwords you might have revealed”, followed
by both Checking the account activity and to Report
theft to the organisation owning the anti-phishing webpage
(15.96%), e.g. “Meanwhile, you should review your bank
and credit card statements for any unusual transactions
or withdrawals and notify the bank immediately if you
suspect any discrepancies.”
Considering the latter from the organisation type point
of view, we can see this recommendation is given virtually
only by the Bank and University type. Apart from this,
however, no big differences can be identified in either the
organisation types and the countries.
4. Discussion
Phishers use a wide variety of vectors to send phishing,
including e-mails, text messages, messengers like What-
sApp, and posts in social media [54]. Not to mention
less modern vectors such as phone calls, posters, flyers,
and stickers – while URLs may be behind text, logos,
buttons, or QR codes. While this range can be vast, most
of the anti-phishing webpages we analysed focused only
on e-mail vectors. While e-mail is historically a very
common threat vector for companies, it is by no means
the only source of such threats. In 2019 Verizon reported
18% of clicks on phishing links to be happening via
mobile devices [54] showing that users are increasingly
engaging with phishing on such devices. Thus, a worried
citizen who is searching for information about phishing
might therefore inaccurately conclude from the presented
data that phishing is only an e-mail issue and incorrectly
assume that tools like WhatsApp are safe, even though
they are not [58].
Also 94% of malware seems to be delivered via e-mail
attachments and 45% being hidden in a Microsoft Office
document [54]. Therefore, attachments remain a serious
source of compromise, yet only 12% of the analysed anti-
phishing webpages mentioned e-mail attachments as po-
tentially dangerous. This omission seems to be especially
prevalent among the 22 University webpages with over
90% focusing on e-mail as phishing vector, but less than
10% discussing e-mail attachments.
Some webpages recommend to check the correctness
of the sender address. However, sender addresses are
fairly easy to spoof [19], [21], [32], allowing the attacker
to impersonate any organisation they see as the most
promising for their attack. It is also possible for a phisher
to compromise the valid account of an individual or
organisation, then use that account to send phishing to
others. Both attacks are serious, since the recipient may
not be aware that from addresses can be inaccurate. Note,
while 40.43% of anti-phishing webpages urged the reader
to look out for unusual or unexpected sender addresses,
none warned readers about the potential of the addresses
being spoofed or compromised themselves.
Many anti-phishing webpages also suggested that the
reader should look at the content of the e-mail and use
elements such as the grammar, layout, and tone to judge
if the e-mail is from a valid company. However, this
approach is known to have issues as phishers improve
in their ability to write well crafted phishing e-mails,
e.g. clone phishing. This is a type of attack where a
legitimate e-mail is replicated in all of its parts, but with
links and/or attachments modified to malicious ones [32]
and the sender address is spoofed. Being a copy of a
legitimate e-mail, the only errors that could be present,
if any, are those that the original sender would have done.
This makes it indistinguishable from the original when
only considering aesthetic features such as grammar or
layout. Furthermore, as e-mail is the only channel for
many online services to their customers, they also use
time pressure and the likes to get readers attention, e.g.
an authentic bill needs to be payed.
URL checking is especially critical since simply vis-
iting a phishing webpage can be enough to get compro-
mised by a drive-by download or another exploit [13]. Ver-
izon lists drive-by downloads as accounting for roughly
10% of malware attack vectors [54]. However, almost one
third of the analysed anti-phishing webpages comprised
at least one webpage-specific phishing cue that readers
should look out for. While the page authors may simply
be trying to provide readers with additional cues on how
to spot phishing, readers may not interpret the information
in that way. Instead they may inaccurately decide that
visiting a webpage is a safe as long as they inspect the
webpage for the listed cues before entering any sensitive
data.
One of the most effective methods of determining if
an e-mail is legitimate or not is looking at the embedded
links and comparing the domain of the URLs to the one
expected from the organisation supposedly sending the e-
mail [5]. Unfortunately, users are currently not very skilled
at doing such comparisons unaided [3], [5], [31], [56].
These results might be not too surprising, as information
on how to check for the destination of a link before
clicking it or how to check the domain of a webpage
before entering sensitive data was missing completely
from almost all of the analysed webpages. Note, when
something related to links was present, it only considered
e-mail links, avoiding explanations regarding mobile de-
vices or link find online, e.g. as part of a social network
post.
Only half of the analysed anti-phishing webpages
showed visual examples; the remaining ones deliver their
recommendations purely as text. However, various liter-
ature on effective learning [14], [24], shows that mem-
orising and understanding information is supported by
visual examples. Thereby, examples will be most effective
when integrated properly. They should not be just listed
as examples for past phishing e-mails without further
explanations why these are phishes and what one can learn
from these examples. Instead, as more than a quarter of
the anti-phishing webpages does, they should be used to
illustrate the mentioned phishing cues.
Our analysis reveals that less than 60% of the anti-
phishing webpages have a section regarding victim sup-
port. This is a serious shortcoming, as readers of anti-
phishing webpages might be on them searching for solu-
tions to a successful attack. However, we acknowledge
that the victim support aspect is more complex in the
private context than in the business one, because of the
different reader motivations. Another angle to consider is
that in the private context, the question who to call if one
has fallen victim to an attack arises as a general problem.
Usually, if one becomes the victim of a criminal activity,
they would call the police. However, the police in many
countries only recently started building up cybercrime
competences and, while responsible for the prosecution
of cybercriminals, it might not be able to support victims
in fixing the potential problems.
This situation in which readers are exposed to out-
dated or incomplete information is hazardous, because it
can easily lead to ”security fatigue” [46]: readers feeling
overwhelmed by the number of different or even conflict-
ing recommendations they receive on the anti-phishing
webpages, might reject the recommendations and decide
on their own accord which ones to follow. This should
be avoided if possible, because readers might misjudge
the importance of certain recommendations and fall into
the trap of either ignoring important recommendations or
trusting in unreliable ones. In both instances, they might
ultimately be exposed to unnecessary risk.
To avoid security fatigue, reduce the inconsistency
of the recommendations given, and to ease both main-
tenance and update of webpages and recommendations
themselves, we propose the creation of a unified template,
to be proposed to a central agency such as ENISA or
CISA.
Employing this template would provide standardised
content throughout all the anti-phishing webpages, solving
the inconsistency issue. It would also provide an easy to
implement tool to web designers. Moreover, it would ease
the maintenance burden: whenever the recommendations
would need updating, the template can be modified ac-
cordingly. Web designers would then need to check if
they are employing the newest version or not, without
preoccupying about its content.
5. Related Works
There have been several studies focusing on recom-
mendations. These can focus on different topics and are
collected in various ways. In the following, we want to
give an overview of this research.
Regarding research focusing on anti-phishing recom-
mendations, Butler and Butler [9] focused on effectiveness
of anti-phishing related information allocated by financial
institutes, including banks. They used the construct of
information quality (IQ) to rate the effectiveness. This
study specifically focused on South Africa and they point
out that the available information is insufficient. In com-
parison to our study, we collected anti-phishing recom-
mendations from multiple organisations and countries.
Orunsol et al. [30] analysed the effectiveness of pub-
licly available anti-phishing webpages of banks in Nigeria.
They used a pre and post test to asses the ability to detect
phish. Between those two tests, the participants had to
choose from a set of bank webpages they are accustomed
to. The authors discovered a low level of effectiveness
when asking participants to judge various messages with
varying phishing cues. While the conclusion is similar to
our - the exact issues with the webpages were not studied
by them. In comparison to our study, Orunsol et al. did not
analyse the webpages on their own, but rather the ability of
detecting phish before and after reading recommendations
from such webpages.
Volkamer and Hilt [55] analysed the content of 83
German webpages from different institutes that provide
anti-phishing information while taking a closed coding
approach. It was checked which aspects of the phishing
awareness measure presented in [27] are covered by other
sources and which aspects are missing in this phishing
awareness measure. They also found that most provided
recommendations remain abstract and don’t provide clear
instructions.
Alnajim and Munro [4] for example examined the
effectiveness of the most common user tips on phishing
webpages detection. They created a so-called effectiveness
score, based on four different criteria: ”The tip prevents
most common clues”, ”solo reliability”, ”the clue cannot
be spoofed”, and ”The tip does not produce false posi-
tives or false negatives”. While this study tried to apply
four different criteria on anti-phishing recommendations,
we tried to focus on how these recommendations were
collected to create an overview. Furthermore, this study is
from 2008 which might not reflect the current situation.
Another topic paying great attention to recommenda-
tions and user awareness is password security and man-
agement. Murray and Malone [26] for example conducted
a study to find the main characteristics of password rec-
ommendations. The recommendations were collected from
21 sources by internet searches, standard agencies and
multinational companies. The peculiarity of their study
is that their framework included the cost-benefit ratio of
each recommendation. Besides that, Murray et al. stud-
ied password recommendations, our focus is on finding
and categorising existing anti-phishing recommendations.
Unfortunately, the process of identifying the recommen-
dations is less systematic than our own approach and
therefore difficult to replicate. However, future lists of
anti-phishing recommendations could be evaluated in a
similar way.
Redmiles, et al. [41] analysed the readability of pub-
licly available general security recommendation. They
asked Amazon MT users to search for security recommen-
dations themselves on the Internet and provide the paper
authors with the corresponding webpages. We consider
our approach in identifying the webpages to be easier to
replicate. Also, while readability is important, we found
a number of issues with the content of webpages we
analysed. We agree that once the issues with the content
are fixed, one should analyse their readability.
6. Conclusion
This paper tried to answer a double research question:
which anti-phishing recommendations can be found on the
Internet and are they helpful to readers?
To this end, we selected and analysed 94 anti-phishing
webpages from four organisation types and eight coun-
tries. We employed inductive coding to collect the main
interesting aspects of both, the common webpage features
and the recommendations given. Then we used these
aspects to create a hierarchical codebook where the top
of the hierarchy were the 14 aspects themselves, and the
lower levels were codes pertaining to each one. At last, we
analysed the data regarding the webpages’ features and the
recommendations by organisation type, by country, and
as a whole, using descriptive statistics to highlight any
interesting findings.
We found that the overall quality of the analysed
anti-phishing webpages is in need of improvement. The
recommendations given are oftentimes limited in scope,
frequently oblivious of phishing vectors other than e-
mail, and insufficient to handle advanced (yet contem-
porary) phishing techniques. The recommendations on
the webpages are also too abstract, lacking the details
needed to be properly employed by the readers. Moreover,
some of the anti-phishing webpages show contradictory
recommendations, potentially heightening the frustration
of the readers and leading to security fatigue.
We argue that this lack of consistent, up to date anti-
phishing information might be one of the causes why so
many people are not able to detect phishing effectively.
To address the identified issues with the available infor-
mation, we propose as way forward the creation of a
standardised template to be adopted by all anti-phishing
webpages.
We believe that developing such template would make
it easier for organisations to create their own effective anti-
phishing webpage and therefore ultimately benefit readers
who are seeking information on phishing attacks for both
prevention and mitigation purposes.
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